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Rationing Healthcare During a Pandemic:
Shielding Healthcare Providers from Tort
Liability in Uncharted Legal Territory

Frederick V. Perry*
Miriam Weismann*

Abstract
As the coronavirus pandemic intensified, many communities in the
U.S. experienced shortages of ventilators, ICU beds, and other
medical supplies and treatment. There was no single national
response providing guidance on the allocation of scarce
healthcare resources. There has been no consistent state response
either. Instead, various governmental and nongovernmental state
actors in several but not all states formulated “triage protocols,”
known as Crisis Standards of Care, to prioritize patient access to
care where population demand exceeded supply. One intended
purpose of the protocols was to immunize or shield healthcare
providers from tort liability based on injuries resulting from a
medical decision rationing access to care. Research shows that
various state protocols have been implemented to this end by
either executive order issued by the governor; state legislation; or
action by individual hospital ethics boards. This paper examines
a legal question of first impression: Whether the right to institute
suit for pandemic related healthcare injuries can be
constitutionally eliminated using state triage protocol immunity
provisions passed by executive order or state statute during the
pandemic. The paper concludes that healthcare providers may
still be subject to some legal liability depending upon each state’s
unique constitutional grant of powers to the executive and
legislative branches and the dictates of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
142

2022]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

143

I. INTRODUCTION…………………...……………………………143
II. FEDERAL LEGAL REQUIREMENTS TO PROVIDE MEDICAL
TREATMENT…………………………………………………145

A. EMTALA…………………………………………………145
B. The Federal Declaration of Limited COVID-19 Liability
Immunity…………………………………………….…..148
C. The PREP Pre-Emption Exclusion…………...………….151
D. The Failed Federal Attempt to Legislate Provider Immunity:
Safe to Work Act……………………………………...…153
E. State Medical Treatment Waivers and
EMTALA………...............................................................155
III. STATE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS TO PROVIDE MEDICAL
TREATMENT……………………………………………..…..156
A. State Law: Executive Orders and Legislation Used to
Allocate Scarce Healthcare Resources During the
Pandemic………………………………………………..157
1. Pushback by State Activists Opposed to CSC SOFA
Scoring Metrics………………….…………………..161
B. Can the States Immunize Healthcare Providers from Tort
Liability Using Executive Orders and/or Legislation?....163
C. Common Law and State Constitutional Prohibitions……164
D. The Fourteenth Amendment Right to Due Process and Equal
Protection……………………………………………….166
E. State Legislation and the Attempt to Provide a Pandemic
Liability Shield………………………………………….167
F. Gubernatorial Executive Orders Providing Immunity Shields
Raise Enforceability Issues………………………….…..173
IV. CONCLUSION………………………………………...……….178
APPENDIX A……………………………………………….……..181
APPENDIX B………………………………………….…………..184

I.

INTRODUCTION

1

As COVID–19, also referred to as the coronavirus pandemic,
[hereinafter “the pandemic”] intensified, many communities in the U.S.
*Frederick V. Perry is a Professor of Business Law at Florida International University.
Miriam Weismann is a Professor of Business Law and Tax at Florida International
University.
1
COVID–19 is an acute respiratory disease that can be spread from person to person
for which there is no known cure at the time of the submission of this article. See How
COVID–19 Spreads, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (last updated July
14, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019–ncov/prevent–getting–sick/how–covid
–spreads.html.
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experienced shortages of ventilators and intensive care (ICU) beds. 2 The
pandemic placed unprecedented demand on the nation’s healthcare
systems.3 Conservative estimates4 show that the health needs created by
COVID–19 far exceeded the capacity of U.S. hospitals.5 Such demand
created the need to ration or plan for rationing medical equipment and care
interventions.
As discussed below, some states responded with triage protocols
referred to as Crisis Standards of Care (CSC), Appendix A,6 some did not
respond at all. This paper focuses on those states that did formulate CSC
guidelines and excludes consideration of non–governmental actors such as
provider hospitals or healthcare associations formulating guidelines on an
informal and legally nonbinding basis.7 It also excludes consideration of
2

Fred Schulte, et.al, Millions of Older Americans Live in Counties with No ICU Beds
as the Pandemic Intensifies, KAISER HEALTH NEWS, Mar. 20, 2020, https://khn.org/
news/as–coronavirus–spreads–widely–millions–of–older–americans–live–in–counties–
with–no–icu–beds/ (“More than half the counties in America have no intensive care beds,
posing a particular danger for more than 7 million people who are age 60 and up ― older
patients who face the highest risk of serious illness or death from the rapid spread of
COVID–19 . . . .”).
3
See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERV., PANDEMIC INFLUENCE PLAN 2017
UPDATE 1, 3 (2017), https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic–resources/pdf/pan–flu–report–
2017v2.pdf.
4
Ezekiel Emanuel, et al., Fair Allocation of Scarce Medical Resources in the Time of
Covid–19, 382 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2049, 2050 (2020). According to the American Hospital
Association, there were 5198 community hospitals and 209 federal hospitals in the United
States in 2018. In the community hospitals, there were 792,417 beds, with 3532 emergency
departments and 96,500 ICU beds, of which 23,000 were neonatal and 5100 pediatric,
leaving just under 68,400 ICU beds of all types for the adult population. Id.
5
Neil M. Ferguson, et al., Impact of Non–pharmaceutical Interventions (NPIs) to
Reduce COVID–19 Mortality and Healthcare Demand, at 7 (Mar. 16, 2020),
https://www.imperial.ac.uk/media/imperial–college/medicine/sph/ide/gida–fellowships/
Imperial–College–COVID19–NPI–modelling–16–03–2020.pdf.
6
Emily C. Cleveland Machanda, et al., Crisis Standards of Care in the USA: A
Systematic Review and Implications for Equity Amidst COVID–19, J. OF RACIAL AND
ETHNIC HEALTH DISPARITIES, 4–5 (2020), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC7425256/pdf/40615_2020_Article_840.pdf. Replicated in Appendix A (Crisis
standards of care are generally frameworks for catastrophic disaster response. For a
discussion of such frameworks, see NAT’L INSTITUTE OF HEALTH, National Library of
Medicine, https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/24830057/; DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERV., Topic Collection: Crisis Standards of Care, https://asprtracie.hhs.gov/technical–
resources/63/crisis–standards–of–care/0; and for Covid specific, See Crisis Standard of
Care Covid–19 Pandemic, from the American Nurses Association 2008
https://www.nursingworld.org/~4ade15/globalassets/docs/ana/ascec_whitepaper031008fi
nal.pdf.
7
In March 2018, the Florida Department of Public Health issued a Preparedness and
Response Multi–Year Training and Exercise Plan (MYTEP). Fla. Dep’t of Health, Public
Health and Health Care Preparedness (PHHP): MYTEP, at 5 (2017), https://www.
ncfhcc.org/wp–content/uploads/2017/08/2018–2020–mytep.pdf. This plan does not
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those states not responding with any triage protocols and/or emergency
plans.
Generally, triage protocols are guided in design by general concepts
of “fairness” under accepted medical ethics rules which provide that
limited medical resources should be allocated “to do the greatest good for
the greatest number of individuals.” 8 There has been to date no single
national response providing for allocation of scare healthcare resources.
Instead, for those states that have fashioned a rationing protocol design,
each state guideline differs in language, implementation, and content.
Various triage protocols are examined below to illustrate this point.
One intended purpose of the various CSC protocols in some states was
to immunize or provide safe harbors to hospitals or healthcare providers
from tort liability based on actions arising from pandemic related injuries
including the consequences from an unavoidable medical decision limiting
access to care. One legal implication of a provider immunity shield from
tort liability is the loss of a patient’s right to exercise otherwise guaranteed
common law rights and remedies and, in some instances, state
constitutional rights that guarantee access to the courts to redress legal

include any discussion of CSC triage protocols. In fact, Florida does not have a state
sponsored plan for healthcare rationing in the event demand exceeds supply. Steve
Contorno & Allison Ross, If hospitals get overwhelmed, Florida is silent on who survives,
TAMPA BAY TIMES (Apr. 19, 2020), https://www.tampabay.com/news/health/2020/
04/18/if–hospitals–get–overwhelmed–florida–is–silent–on–who–survives/. Recognizing
the problem, the Florida Bioethics Network (FBN) filled the gap. See FLA. BIOETHICS
NETWORK, ETHICS GUIDELINES FOR CRISIS STANDARDS OF CARE IN PUBLIC HEALTH
EMERGENCIES, at 10 (2020) https://fha.informz.net/FHA/data/images/CSC–FBN–3.pdf.
The FBN plan has been endorsed by the Florida Hospital Association which is made up of
200 hospitals. However, the FBN plan is not authorized as an appropriate triage protocol
by the state. Id. at 1 (“No FBN members are authorized to speak on behalf of any institution
they might work or volunteer for, and any listing of members’ institutions is for
identification purposes only. This document does not provide, and should not be inferred
to provide, legal advice of any kind.”).
8
Am. Nurses Ass’n, Adapting Standards of Care Under Extreme Conditions, at 1
(2008),
https://www.nursingworld.org/~496044/globalassets/practiceandpolicy/work–
environment/health––safety/coronavirus/crisis–standards–of–care.pdf (for the proposition
that “in a pandemic, nurses can find themselves operating in crisis standards of care
environments. In such situations, a utilitarian framework usually guides practice decisions
and actions with special emphasis on transparency, protection of the public, proportional
restriction of individual liberty, and fair stewardship of resources); see infra note 96 (noting
that healthcare rationing policies are designed to direct limited resources toward patients
most likely to benefit from them). This notion derives from the Classical Utilitarians,
Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill posited that we ought to “maximize the good, that
is, bring about ‘the greatest amount of good for the greatest number.’” Julia Driver, The
History of Utilitarianism, STANFORD ENCYC. OF PHILOSOPHY, https://plato.stanford.
edu/entries/utilitarianism–history/ (Sept. 22, 2014).
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grievances.9 This paper examines a legal question of first impression:
Whether the right to institute suit for pandemic related injuries can be
constitutionally eliminated using triage protocols whether implemented by
executive order or state statute during the pandemic. The paper concludes
that healthcare providers may still be subject to some legal liability
depending upon each state’s unique constitutional grant of powers to the
executive and legislative branches and the dictates of due process and
equal protection of law as provided in the Fourteenth Amendment.10

II.
A.

FEDERAL LEGAL REQUIREMENTS TO PROVIDE MEDICAL
TREATMENT
EMTALA

The federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 11
commonly referred to as “EMTALA,” was enacted by Congress in
response to a concern over “patient dumping” by hospitals refusing
treatment of individuals who could not afford to pay for medical services.12
EMTALA imposes a legal duty on the hospital and its physicians to
provide medical screening examinations, medical stabilization 13 and
treatment of all individuals seeking emergency care,14 regardless of the
9

See discussion of the common law tradition of rights in tort and of state constitutions
infra Section III. C.
10
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides: “All
persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
11
See Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act of 1986 (EMTALA), 42
U.S.C. § 1395dd. “In the case of a hospital that has a hospital emergency department, if
any individual . . . comes to the emergency department and a request is made . . . for
examination or treatment for a medical condition, the hospital must provide an appropriate
medical screening examination within the capability of the hospital’s emergency
department, including ancillary services routinely available to the emergency department
to determine if an emergency medical condition . . . exists.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a).
12
June M. McKoy, Obligation to Provide Services: A Physician–Public Defender
Comparison, AMA Journal of Ethics (May, 2006).
https://journalofethics.ama–assn.org/article/obligation–provide–services–physician–
public–defender–comparison/2006–05
13
“‘To stabilize’ means . . . [that] within reasonable medical probability . . . no material
deterioration” should occur from or during the transfer. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(3)(A).
14
The term “emergency medical condition” means “[A] medical condition manifesting
itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that the absence
of immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to result in—(i) placing the
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individual’s ability to pay.15 Notably, it does not matter if the patient was
denied EMTALA treatment for non–monetary reasons as the Supreme
Court has held that no “improper motive,” financial or otherwise, must be
proved to find a hospital in violation of EMTALA.16
By definition, EMTALA applies to a medical condition like COVID–
19 manifesting itself by “acute symptoms of sufficient severity (including
severe pain) such that the absence of immediate medical attention could
reasonably be expected to result in placing the health of the individual in
serious jeopardy, cause serious impairment to bodily functions, or cause
serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part.”17 Almost immediately,
CMS made clear that “it is a violation of EMTALA for hospitals and
critical access hospitals [hereinafter “CAHs”] with emergency
departments [hereinafter “ED”] to use signage that presents barriers to
individuals, including those who are suspected of having COVID–19,
from coming to the ED, or to otherwise refuse to provide an appropriate
medical screening examination [hereinafter “MSE”] to anyone who has
come to the ED for examination or treatment of a medical condition.” 18
Additionally, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS)
observed that EMTALA likewise applies if a community has exhausted its
supply of beds and/or ventilators and a patient presents with an emergent
condition that requires these resources for stabilization. “In situations
where facilities may not have the necessary services or equipment, they
should provide stabilizing interventions within their capability until the
individual can be transferred. For example, in cases where the hospital
does not have available ventilators, establishing an advanced airway and
providing manual ventilation can assist in stabilizing the individual until

health of the individual (or, with respect to a pregnant woman, the health of the woman or
her unborn child) in serious jeopardy, (ii) serious impairment to bodily functions, or (iii)
serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1).
15
Brenda Goodman & Andy Miller, Lives Lost Amid ER Violations, Investigation Finds,
GA. HEALTH NEWS, (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.georgiahealthnews.com/2018/11/
investigation–finds–lives–lost–er–violations/. 4,341 EMTALA violations occurred at
1,682 hospitals nationwide between 2008–18. EMTALA violations occurred more often at
hospitals with fewer than 100 beds, with these hospitals accounting for 34 percent of
violations. Id.
16
Roberts v. Galen of Virginia, Inc., 525 U.S. 249, 249 (1999) (explaining that a plaintiff
does not need to prove that the hospital acted with improper motive in failing to stabilize
her in order to recover in a suit alleging a violation of § 1395dd(b)).
17
AM. COLL. OF EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, EMTALA Fact Sheet (2021), https://www.
acep.org/life–as–a–physician/ethics––legal/emtala/emtala–fact–sheet/.
18
CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
FOR HOSPITALS AND CRITICAL ACCESS HOSPITALS REGARDING EMTALA (Apr. 30, 2020),
https://www.cms.gov/files/document/frequently–asked–questions–and–answers–emtala–
part–ii.pdf.
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an appropriate transfer can be arranged.”19 There is nothing in the statute,
regulations or CMS guidelines that allow some patients to be denied
treatment under state triage protocols as an alternative to mandated
treatment under EMTALA. Thus, rationing healthcare by hospitals and
CAHs has the potential to violate the federal statutory legal
obligation to screen and stabilize patients presenting to hospital EDs
for treatment and is legally impermissible under federal legislation
mandating access to care. 20 This is true even though the full
application of EMTALA was later circumscribed by a federal declaration
of COVID–19 immunity and section 1135 waivers.21 However, the section
1135 immunity waivers were not a stabilization mandate substitute.
In fact, Section 1135 waivers are expressly limited to situations arising
out of the need by a hospital to “transfer” covid patients not yet stabilized
due to an emergency or “redirect” patients under recognized state
emergency pandemic treatment plans.22 However, these waivers to
provide Medical Screening Examinations (MSE) at an offsite alternate
screening location not owned or operated by the hospital are subject to
review on a case–by–case basis.23 In interpreting the section 1135 waiver
provision, CMS underscores that “. . . there is no waiver authority
available for any other EMTALA requirement.” [Emphasis added].24
Thus, the waiver only authorizes non–stabilized patient transfers in an
emergency or under a recognized state emergency pandemic plan, which
“[U]nder section 1135 of the Social Security Act, the Secretary [of HHS] may
temporarily waive or modify certain Medicare, Medicaid, and Children’s Health Insurance
Program (CHIP) requirements to ensure [that] [s]ufficient health care items and services
are available to meet the needs of individuals enrolled in Social Security Act programs in
the emergency area and time periods[, and that] [p]roviders who provide such services in
good faith can be reimbursed and exempted from sanctions (absent any determination of
fraud or abuse).” CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, 1135 WAIVER AT A
GLANCE, https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Provider–Enrollment–and–Certification/Survey
CertEmergPrep/Downloads/1135–Waivers–At–A–Glance.pdf.
20
See CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, COVID–19 EMERGENCY
DECLARATION BLANKET WAIVERS FOR HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS (Mar. 30, 2020),
https://www.cms.gov/files/document/covid19–emergency–declaration–health–care–
providers–fact–sheet.pdf.
21
See id.
22
The waiver provides as follows, in pertinent part: “Only two aspects of the EMTALA
requirements can be waived under 1135 Waiver Authority: 1) Transfer of an individual
who has not been stabilized, if the transfer arises out of an emergency or, 2) Redirection to
another location (offsite alternate screening location) to receive a medical screening exam
under a state emergency preparedness or pandemic plan. A waiver of EMTALA sanctions
is effective only if actions under the waiver do not discriminate as to source of payment or
ability to pay. Hospitals are generally able to manage the separation and flow of potentially
infectious patients through alternate screening locations on the hospital campus. Id.
23
See id.
24
Id.
19
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parenthetically was not implemented in all states as indicated in Appendix
A.
Additionally, under EMTALA, physicians are subject to federal civil
monetary penalties and may be subject to exclusion from participation in
the Medicare and Medicaid programs for gross and flagrant or repeated
violations of EMTALA.25 Although a patient cannot directly sue a
physician for noncompliance with EMTALA’s requirements,26 physicians
may still be subject to a patient tort claim for medical malpractice arising
out of the failure to properly administer the federal EMTALA
requirements.27

B.
The Federal Declaration of Limited COVID–19 Liability
Immunity
On March 17, 2020, HHS declared COVID–19 a public health
emergency28 under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness
Act29 [hereinafter “PREP”]. PREP was intended to directly impact states,
providing a source of potential liability protection for governmental and
private sector persons developing and administering “approved
countermeasures”30 during a public health emergency. The Declaration
states that its purpose is to provide “liability immunity for activities related
to medical countermeasures31 against COVID–19.” 32 The immunity
provisions were specifically directed to “covered persons” defined as

25

See 42 U.S.C. §1395(dd)(d)(2)(A); See Coleman v. Deno, 813 So. 2d 303, 313–14
(La. 2002) (for the proposition that the court upheld a malpractice claim against a physician
for “patient dumping” and the improper transfer of a patient under EMTALA while
hospitalized and under the physician’s treatment). Negligence is not the standard here. It is
the violation of the statute that exposes the physician and hospital to liability.
26
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(a).
27
See id.
28
See DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERV., DECLARATION UNDER THE PUBLIC READINESS
AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ACT FOR COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST COVID–19, 85
FED REG. 15198 (2020). [hereinafter “Declaration”].
29
See 42 U.S.C. § 243 (2005) (PREP amended the Public Health Service (PHS) Act,
adding § 319F–3 (liability immunity) and § 319F–4 (compensation program). These
sections are codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 247d–6d and 247d–6e, respectively.).
30
42 U.S.C. § 247d–6d.
31
See Declaration, supra note 28, at 15199–200. A covered countermeasure must be a
“qualified pandemic or epidemic product”; a “security countermeasure”; a drug, biological
product, or device authorized for emergency use in accordance with various sections of the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act; or certain approved respiratory protective devices.
Qualified pandemic and epidemic products may also include products that “limit the harm
such a pandemic or epidemic might otherwise cause.” Id.
32
Id. at 15198.
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manufacturers, distributors, and others including hospitals, physicians and
other healthcare professionals engaged in COVID–19–related efforts. 33
However, after the Declaration was issued, there were numerous
questions regarding the scope and applicability of the immunity provisions
under the Declaration. No one was really sure what PREP meant in terms
of a provider immunity shield. In an attempt to clarify, on April 14, 2020,
HHS issued an Omnibus Advisory Opinion34 [hereinafter “Opinion”] that
provided additional non–binding guidance, not having the force of law,35
on this question. If all requirements of PREP and the Declaration are met,
the Opinion provides that PREP immunity covers both tort and contract
claims, including claims for loss relating to compliance with local, state,
or federal laws, regulations, or other legal requirements.36 However,
immunity is expressly limited to claims for personal injury or damage to
property.37
The Opinion clarified that immunity only “applies when a covered
person engages in activities related to an agreement or arrangement with
the federal government, or when a covered person acts according to an
[a]uthority [h]aving [j]urisdiction to respond to a declared emergency.”38
The Opinion interprets these two conditions broadly to include: (1) any
arrangement with the federal government, or (2) any activity that is part of
an authorized emergency response at the federal, regional, state, or local
level. “Such activities can be authorized through, among other things,
guidance, requests for assistance, agreements, or other arrangements.”39
However, “PREP immunity is not absolute.”40 It does not provide
immunity against federal civil, criminal, or administrative actions. “Nor
does it provide immunity against suit and liability for claims under federal
law for equitable relief.”41 Also, a covered person is not immune from
Id. at 15199. The Declaration defines “covered persons” for purposes of its immunity
provisions to include “a qualified person” defined as a licensed health professional or other
individual authorized to prescribe, administer, or dispense Covered Countermeasures
under the law of the state in which the Covered Countermeasure was prescribed,
administered or dispensed. Id. The term “person” includes an individual, partnership,
corporation, association, entity, or public or private corporation, including a federal, state,
or local government agency or department. 42 U.S.C. § 247d–6d(i)(5).
34
DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERV., ADVISORY OPINION ON THE PUBLIC READINESS
AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ACT FOR COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST COVID–19, at 1
(2020), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/prep–act–advisory–opinion–hhs–ogc.pdf .
35
See id. (“It is not a final agency action or a final order. Nor does it bind HHS or the
federal courts. It does not have the force or effect of law.”).
36
See id. at 2.
37
See id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
33
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liability for willful misconduct that proximately causes death or serious
injury.42 Thus, there is no immunity for intentional tort liability. Finally,
in states where no protocol exists, there is no “authorized emergency
response” at the state level that would qualify for provider immunity under
the second prong of the Opinion.43
A month later on May 19, 2020, HHS issued an Advisory Opinion
signed by General Counsel, Robert Charrow, further clarifying the scope
and application of the PREP immunity waiver provision [hereinafter
“Advisory Opinion].44 According to the Advisory Opinion: “The PREP
Act authorizes the Secretary to issue a declaration to provide liability
immunity to certain individuals and entities (covered persons) against any
claim of loss caused by, arising out of, relating to, or resulting from the
manufacture, distribution, administration, or use of medical
countermeasures (covered countermeasures).”45 The Advisory Opinion
again emphasizes that the PREP Act applies only to covered persons
engaged in covered countermeasures. The Advisory Opinion concludes by
stating that “HHS encourages all covered persons using or administering
covered countermeasures to document the reasonable precautions they
have taken to safely use the covered countermeasures.”46 This language
seemingly adds a duty of care requiring reasonable safety precautions
when implementing countermeasures under the immunity provision.
Parenthetically, there is nothing in the Advisory Opinion or in PREP
shielding healthcare providers from liability for personal injury claims
arising out of healthcare rationing protocols that limit or deny access to
state healthcare resources. The specific question of permissible rationing
is not specifically listed as an authorized countermeasure, and it remains
unclear if rationing fits under the language “any activity.” As noted in the
following discussion of the PREP pre–emption exclusion, it would not
appear that “any activity” is intended to immunize healthcare rationing or
denial of healthcare access resulting in a claim for resulting injuries.
In terms of legal guidance, it is also significant that in any case, neither
the Opinion nor the Advisory Opinion have the force of law, potentially
leaving several legal questions unresolved as well. For example, does
PREP immunize healthcare providers at the state level for other tort
See 42 U.S.C. § 247d–6d(c)(3). “Any action [alleging an exception to immunity for
covered persons] shall be assigned initially to a panel of three judges [the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia].” 42 U.S.C. § 247d–6d(e)(1), (5). And to
prevail, a plaintiff must establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the willful
misconduct proximately caused death or serious injury. See 42 U.S.C. § 247d–6d(c)(3).
43
See DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERV., supra note 34, at 2.
44
See id.
45
Id. at 3
46
Id. at 8.
42
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actions such as gross negligence or medical malpractice for claims arising
out a refusal treat where medical resources are otherwise unavailable?
These ambiguities in the PREP legislation are further complicated by an
accompanying “pre–emption exclusion” contained in the PREP legislation
(discussed in the next section) and the subsequent issuance by CMS of the
Section 1135 waiver addressed above that expressly forbids any waiver
authority for any other EMTALA requirement outside of the parameters
of the section 1135 transfer waiver.47

C.

The PREP Pre–Emption Exclusion

PREP includes a pre–emption exclusion.48 This exclusion provides
that “no State or political subdivision of a State may establish, enforce, or
continue in effect with respect to a covered countermeasure any provision
of law or legal requirement that is different from, or is in conflict with, any
requirement applicable under this section.”49 In forceful language, the
statutory pre–emption exclusion makes clear that patients’ legal rights
were not intended to be suspended or otherwise pre–empted by state or
local laws in conflict with PREP during the crisis.50 This last part of the
pre–emption exclusion seemingly contradicts the language of the non–
legally binding Opinion which interprets with approval any activity that
is part of an authorized emergency response at the federal, regional, state,
or local level.51 Alternatively, reading the Opinion, the Advisory Opinion,
and the pre–emption exclusion together, could support the conclusion that
PREP immunity applies only to a covered person engaged in covered
countermeasures and not to the suspension of a patient’s right to equal
access to care, even by CSC guidelines issued by executive order or
pursuant to state statute.52 This interpretation might smooth any discord
between the Opinion and the exclusion.53 However, that statutory
construction would require a judicial determination.
Likewise, this proposed statutory interpretation finds some support in
the position of the HHS Office of Civil Rights [hereinafter “OCR”]. On
47

See CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, supra note 20.
See 42 U.S.C. § 247d–6d(b)(8)(A), (b)(1).
49
§ 247d–6d(b)(8).
50
See Kathleen Liddell et al., Who Gets the Ventilator? Important Legal Rights in the
COVID–19 Pandemic, 46 (7) J. MED. ETHICS, 421–426 (2020).
51
Supra note 34.
52
Id.
53
See See Kathleen Liddell et al., Who Gets the Ventilator? Important Legal Rights in
the COVID–19 Pandemic, 46 (7) J. MED. ETHICS, 421–426 (2020)..; cf. A. E. Nettleton
Co. v. Diamond, 27 N.Y.2d 182,193 (1970) (When a statute is challenged on nonprocedural
grounds as violative of due process of law, the court considers whether there is “‘some fair,
just and reasonable connection’ between the language of the statute and the promotion of
the health, comfort, safety and welfare of society”).
48
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March 28, 2020, shortly before the issuance of the Opinion, OCR issued a
Bulletin to ensure that healthcare entities “keep in mind their obligations
under laws and regulations that prohibit discrimination on the basis of
race, color, national origin, disability, age, sex, and exercise of conscience
and religion in HHS–funded programs.”54 The Bulletin cautioned that the
“laudable goal of providing care quickly and efficiently must be guided by
the fundamental principles of fairness, equality, and compassion that
animate our civil rights laws.”55 Likewise, OCR’s director emphasized
that, “HHS is committed to leaving no one behind during an emergency,
and this guidance is designed to help health care providers meet that
goal . . . Our civil rights laws protect the equal dignity of every human life
from ruthless utilitarianism.”56
Thus, while PREP provides some immunity to providers, the scope of
the immunity remains at least subject to the requirements of civil rights
laws which are not suspended during a declared state of emergency arising
out of the pandemic. Given that several legal scholars have suggested that
various state triage CSC guidelines allocating scarce resources may have
a discriminatory impact in application on the disabled and minorities, such
an emergency response may subject providers to a claimed violation of
patient civil rights.57
The state triage protocol system and the use of CSC, endorsed by
HHS,58 is designed in part to provide some legal relief to hospitals and
physicians, although the extent of that protection is not clear given the
EMTALA and PREP legislative mandates just examined above. As we
will see, some states, but not all, did include a grant of immunity to
providers in their respective CSC guidelines to protect those providers
implementing state triage protocols otherwise approved by HHS.59
However, the research does not reveal any formal approval process by
HHS of the state triage protocols issued during the pandemic. Nor is there

Civil Rights, HIPAA, and the Coronavirus Disease 2019, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM.
SERV. OFF. FOR CIV. RTS. (Mar. 28, 2020), at 1.
55
Id.
56
Id.; See AM. NURSES ASS’N, supra note 8.
57
See Miriam Weismann & Cheryl Holder, Ruthless Utilitarianism? COVID 19 State
Triage Protocols May Subject Patients to Racial Discrimination and Providers to Legal
Liability, 47 AM. J.L. & MED. 264 (2021); see also Liddell et al., supra note 53.
58
See Benjamin J. McMichael et al., COVID–19 And State Medical Liability Immunity,
HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (May 14, 2020), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/
hblog20200508.885890/full/.
59
See Appendix A.
54
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any formal statement by HHS which approves any particular state triage
protocol, including healthcare rationing, issued during the pandemic.60

D.
The Failed Federal Attempt to Legislate Provider
Immunity: Safe to Work Act
In an effort to provide some relief from medical malpractice exposure
during the pandemic, Congress did propose draft legislation, The Safe to
Work Act,61 [hereinafter “SWA”] to provide a “liability shield” protecting
businesses and healthcare providers against workers, customers and
patients suing over pandemic–related injuries. SWA was first introduced
on July 27, 2020, in a previous session of Congress, but it did not receive
a vote.62 In summary, the proposed legislation would have enacted a five–
year period of limited immunity for certain defendants in coronavirus–
related personal injury and medical malpractice suits.63 These cases,
normally filed in state civil courts, would fall under federal court
jurisdiction with a one–year statute of limitations within which to file the
lawsuit.64 Under the proposed legislation, plaintiff patients must satisfy a
two–pronged requirement to establish that a healthcare provider or
business was grossly negligent or engaged in willful misconduct and that
the provider failed to make “reasonable efforts” to comply with applicable
federal or state public health guidance.65 In short, a claim of gross
negligence would fail if a defendant provider could establish it made a
reasonable effort, but failed, to comply with pandemic safety measures.66
60

There are at least two circumstances where HHS rejected state protocols of
Washington and Alabama as violative of civil rights. See Sheri Fink, U.S. Civil Rights
Office Rejects Rationing Medical Care Based on Disability, Age,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/28/us/coronavirus–
disabilities–rationing–ventilators–triage.html.
61
See Safe to Work Act, S. 4317, 116th Cong. (2020). https://www.congress.gov/
bill/116th–congress/senate–bill/4317/text.
62
See S. 4317 (116th): SAFE TO WORK Act, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bills/116/s4317 (last visited Oct. 26, 2021).
63
See Safe to Work Act, S. 4317, 116th Cong. (2020).
64
See id.
65
See id.
66
See id. Other salient features of the proposed legislation include: The bill states that
the liability shield is retroactive to Dec. 1 and will remain in effect until either Oct. 1, 2024,
or the end of the national public health crisis as declared by the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services, whichever is later. If a coronavirus–related suit is filed in or removed
to federal court, a plaintiff must provide an opinion from a medical expert essentially
vouching for an injured party’s claim. Plaintiffs are required to provide a list of the places
they went and people they met in the 14–day period prior to experiencing symptoms, as
well as any persons who visited their residence during that period. Overall awards can be
reduced to account for payments made by so–called collateral sources such as insurance
companies and government reimbursements. In cases where there are multiple defendants,
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Again, the legal standard still required a duty of care to engage in a
reasonable effort to comply with safety guidelines. However, the proposed
statute makes no specific reference to healthcare rationing or the denial of
access to healthcare.
The Act’s Senate sponsors, argued that passage of the Act was legally
required to limit or eliminate the risk of expensive litigation that might
deter businesses and other entities, such as healthcare providers, and
jeopardize the nation’s recovery from the pandemic, and put at risk the
investment of taxpayer dollars under the CARES Act.67 Critics argue that
the “preponderance of provisions contained in the bill is nothing more than
a business liability shield.”68 Opponents also argued that the Act would
eliminate an important incentive for individuals and entities to comply
with government standards and guidelines intended to protect workers and
the public. Opponents concluded that “the Act would leave vulnerable
individuals who are exposed to the coronavirus without recourse if they
suffer harm because of lax compliance.”69
SWA was never passed signaling that healthcare providers remain
exposed to the threat of legal liability. The liability shield question was in
any case not resolved at the federal level. Nor have the requirements of
due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment,
guaranteeing litigants access to the courts to redress legal grievances, been
diminished by the pandemic. The question of due process and equal
defendants will only be responsible for a proportionate share of damages, and it will be up
to juries to determine the percentage of fault for each defendant. The bill includes a “loser
pays” provision that allows prevailing defendants to seek compensatory and punitive
damages if a claim outlined in a demand letter turns out to be meritless.
67
The CARES Act was designed to stimulate the economy by putting money into the
hands of small, medium sized and large businesses, but tort lawsuits would extract the same
money from intended business recipients, thereby having an adverse effect on economic
recovery. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY. About the CARES Act and the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, https://home.treasury.gov/policy–issues/coronavirus/about–the–
cares–act#:~:text=The%20Coronavirus%20Aid%2C%20Relief%2C%20and,%2C%20
small%20businesses%2C%20and%20industries. (last visited Jan. 5, 2021).
68
Julia Musto, Senate GOP’s SAFE TO WORK Act may be crucial point in stimulus
talks, FOX NEWS (Sept. 8, 2020), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/senate–republicans–
safe–to–work–act–could–be–difference–between–stimulus–deal–or–not; See generally
Tami S. Smason et al., Proposed SAFE TO WORK Act Offers Protections to Businesses
Impacted by COVID–19, 293 THE NAT’L LAW REVIEW 197 (Aug. 21, 2020),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/proposed–safe–to–work–act–offers–protections–
to–businesses–impacted–covid–19; See also Gary Anderson, Democrats allow abuse of
legal system by not supporting ‘Safe to Work’, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2020),
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/aug/11/democrats–allow–abuse–of–legal–
system–by–not–suppo/.
69
The SAFE TO WORK Act: An In–Depth Guide for Employers to the Senate’s
Proposed Coronavirus Liability Shield, MORRISON & FOERSTER (Aug. 11, 2020),
https://www.mofo.com/resources/insights/200811–safe–to–work–act.html.
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protection is addressed below in the context of the state response to the
threat of provider legal liability given the absence of a cogent federal
response.

E.

State Medical Treatment Waivers and EMTALA

CMS did not deny the states the continued use of a medical treatment
waiver during the pandemic but did expressly circumscribe its use in
conformity with HHS pronouncements.70 Specifically, state medical
treatment waivers71 may not include waiver of protections granted under
other laws such as the federal civil rights laws. Hospitals receiving federal
financial assistance likewise remain obligated to comply with federal civil
rights laws, including Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act and
the Hill–Burton Act.72 As discussed below, these federal laws require
equal medical treatment especially for the disabled and other vulnerable
populations.73 In this regard, there is some legal concern that state CSC
guidelines may have the impact of discriminating against the disabled and
minorities in prioritizing access to limited treatment resources.74 There
appears to be no liability shield in this case.
Thus, the federal EMTALA obligations to treat patients until
stabilized and provide all necessary treatment that does not deviate from
accepted norms of practice, may create a legal quandary for medical
providers where demand for healthcare treatment exceeds the supply. This
is confounded by the complete absence of national CSC guidelines for
allocating ICU beds, ventilators and other necessary medical treatment

“In general, a liability waiver (sometimes called a ‘release of liability’) is a legal
agreement where the signer does two things: 1) ‘waives’ (or gives up) the right to sue in
the event of misfortune or ‘simple negligence,’ and 2) releases a person or organization
from ‘liability.’” Stephen Porritt, “What’s a Medical Liability Waiver?” and Other
Important Questions Answered, WAIVERSIGN (Oct. 21, 2020), https://www.waiversign.
com/blog/medical–liability–waiver. For such waivers to constitute binding legal consent,
“the waiver needs to explain the risks involved in the given activity, and the signer needs
to be given time to read it.” See id.
71
See CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, supra note 20 at 4.
72
See id. at 11; see Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794
(disability), under any health program or activity, any part of which is receiving federal
financial assistance; any program or activity administered by the Department under Title I
of the Act; or any program or activity administered by any entity established under such
Title (Emphasis added). HHS. Gov, Section 1557 of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, https://www.hhs.gov/civil–rights/for–individuals/section–1557/index.html.
73
See generally Weismann & Holder, supra note 57 at 272–73.
74
See, e.g., id.
70
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during a declared emergency like a pandemic 75 and the failure to
legislate a provider liability shield under the SWA.
Nonetheless, states are still faced with the practical legal quandary of
satisfying federal laws while at the same time dealing with the impact of
medical resource shortages. Accordingly, several states formulated and
adopted their own CSC guidelines to deal with the pandemic. A
consideration of the state legal landscape and the varied attempts to offer
medical providers a liability shield may raise more legal hurdles than it
can resolve.

III.

STATE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS TO PROVIDE MEDICAL
TREATMENT

While federal law does not provide a direct cause of action for
malpractice against physicians for failure to treat, state law does.76 Under
state law, physicians have no duty to accept a patient, regardless of the
severity of the illness.77 A physician’s relationship with a patient is
voluntary, a contracted one. However, once a treatment relationship exists,
the physician has legal duty to treat and must provide all necessary
treatment to a patient unless the relationship is ended by the patient or by
the physician, provided that the physician gives the patient sufficient
notice to seek another source of medical care.78 In failing to meet these
requirements, “medical malpractice is defined as any act or omission by a
physician during treatment of a patient that deviates from accepted norms
of practice in the medical community and causes an injury to the patient.”79

A.
State Law: Executive Orders and Legislation Used to
Allocate Scarce Healthcare Resources During the Pandemic
Rationing of medical resources became a critical issue in several states
as the number of patients contracting the coronavirus increased in the U.S.

75

Alice Park & Jeffrey Kluger, The Coronavirus Pandemic Is Forcing U.S.
Doctors to Ration Care for All Patients, TIME (Apr. 22, 2020, 8:00 AM),
https://time.com/5825145/coronavirus–rationing–health–care/.
76
See B. Sony Bal, An Introduction to Medical Malpractice in the United States, 467
CLINICAL ORTHOPEDICS RELATED RSCH., 339–347 (2009).
77
Bernard Lo, Resolving Ethical Dilemmas, at 183, Wolters Kluwer, 4th Edition (2009)
78
See Valarie Blake, When Is a Physician–Patient Relationship Established? 14 AMA
J. OF ETHICS (2012) (citing Ricks v. Budge, 64 P.2d 208, 211–212 (Utah 1937)).
79
Bal, supra note 76.
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In March 2020, the governors of Arizona,80 Florida,81 California,82
Georgia83 and New York84 declared a state of emergency based on the
coronavirus. By March 17, 2020, forty–eight states had followed suit.85
The emergency declarations were followed by some states implementing
new or preexisting Crisis Standards of Care (CSC) guidelines which
provide in part a method to ration healthcare services when patient demand
exceeds medical services supply. These protocols are formulated and
issued by the states in the form of triage protocols. The National Academy
of Science (NAS) has also issued voluntary advisory guidelines for state
guidance in implementing CSC protocols.86
The NAS guidelines provide that CSC protocols should only be
activated when a pervasive or catastrophic disaster make it “impossible”
to meet usual health care standards.87 The NAS guidelines acknowledge
that while CSC protocols “strive to save the most lives possible, . . . some
individual patients will die, who would otherwise survive under usual
care.”88 “Implementation of CSC will require facility–specific decisions
regarding the allocation of limited resources, including how patients will
be triaged to receive life–saving care.”89 Notably, the guidelines do not
define the term “impossible” or the specific criteria to be applied by
facilities in reaching a care rationing decision.
Further, without providing any legal basis for its conclusion, NAS
observes that “[u]nder disaster conditions, adherence to core constitutional

80

Elizabeth Whitman, Arizona Governor Declares State of Emergency on Coronavirus,
with Nine Cases So Far, PHX. NEW TIMES (Mar. 11, 2020, 3:45 PM) https://www.
phoenixnewtimes.com/news/arizona–governor–declares–state–of–emergency–over–
coronavirus–11456074.
81
Fla. Exec. Order No. 20–52 (Mar. 1, 2020), https://www.flgov.com/wp–
content/uploads/2020/03/EO–20–52.pdf.
82
Cal. Proclamation of a State of Emergency (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.gov. ca.
gov/wp–content/uploads/2020/03/3.4.20–Coronavirus–SOE–Proclamation.pdf.
83
Ga. Declaration of Public Health State of Emergency (Mar. 14, 2020),
https://gov.georgia.gov/executive–action/executive–orders/2020–executive–orders.
84
N.Y. Exec. Order No. 202, (Mar. 7, 2020), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/no–
202–declaring–disaster–emergency–state–new–york.
85
Rosie Pepper, Almost all US states have declared states of emergency to fight
coronavirus — here’s what it means for them, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 17, 2020, 1:34 AM)
https://www.businessinsider.com/california–washington–state–of–emergency–
coronavirus–what–it–means–2020–3.
86
See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, AND MED., RAPID EXPERT CONSULTATION ON
CRISIS STANDARDS OF CARE FOR THE COVID–19 PANDEMIC (2020), https://files
.asprtracie.hhs.gov/documents/nap–rapid–expert–consultation–on–csc–for–covid–19–
pandemic.pdf.
87
Id. at 82.
88
Id. at 2.
89
Id.
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principles remains a constant, but other statutory or regulatory provisions
can be altered as necessary in real time.”90 NAS continues:
The law must inform CSC and create incentives for
protecting the public’s health and respecting individual
rights. Extreme scarcity can necessitate difficult life–and–
death decisions. Health care workers who will have to
make them must have adequate guidance and legal
protections. They must be able to follow the rule of law,
even under disaster conditions.91
Thus, at least two things are required according to the NAS when life
and death decisions are being made by providers during the pandemic:
adequate guidance and legal protections allowing providers the ability to
follow the law.
A comparison of several state CSC protocols demonstrates that the
most common metric used by states or healthcare organizations to justify
rationing healthcare,92 is the Sequential Organ Failure Assessment
[hereinafter “SOFA”] score.93 The SOFA triage protocol is based on a
priority point system formula.94 The formula specifies the order in which
90

Id. at 3.
Id. at 5.
92
For example, in a medical study conducted using 26 state guidelines used to determine
ventilator rationing, 24 of the 26 states recommended objective scoring systems for the
allocation of ventilators. Gina M. Piscitello et al., Variation in Ventilator Allocation
Guidelines by US State During the Coronavirus Disease 2019 Pandemic, JAMA NETWORK
OPEN (June 19, 2020), at 1, 3, https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/full
article/2767360. Furthermore, Sequential Organ Failure Assessment (“SOFA”) scoring
was recommended in 15 of the 26 state guidelines. Id. at 1.
93
Other models, such as the Pitt Model, integrate SOFA scoring models to eliminate
exclusion criteria that are not adjusted for the potential of discriminatory impact. However,
even under the Pitt Model, higher SOFA scores may still result in lower priority for
receiving care, a subtle distinction within exclusion metrics. See Douglas B. White ET AL.,
Allocation of Scarce Critical Care Resources During a Public Health Emergency
Executive Summary, UNIV. OF PITT. SCHOOL OF MEDICINE, 1, 2 (Apr. 15, 2020),
https://ccm.pitt.edu/sites/default/files/UnivPittsburgh_ModelHospitalResourcePolicy_202
0_04_15.pdf for the proposition that: “There are compelling reasons to not use exclusion
criteria. Categorically excluding patients will make many feel that their lives are not worth
saving, leading to justified perceptions of discrimination. Moreover, categorical exclusions
are too rigid to be used in a dynamic crisis, when ventilator shortages will likely surge and
decline episodically during the pandemic. In addition, such exclusions violate a
fundamental principle of public health ethics: use the means that are least restrictive to
individual liberty to accomplish the public health goal. Categorical exclusions are not
necessary because less restrictive approaches are feasible, such as allowing all patients to
be eligible and giving priority to those most likely to benefit.”
94
See Gina M. Piscitello et al., Variation in Ventilator Allocation by US States During
the Coronavirus Disease 2019 Pandemic: A Systematic Review, JAMA NETWORK OPEN 1,
91
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a needed resource, like a ventilator, is to be rationed for patients.95 The
priority order is determined by patient mortality risk. Using mortality risk,
a patient’s priority assignment is re–evaluated every 48 hours to determine
if there is any change in health status.96 Mortality risk is also measured by
the Sequential Organ Failure Assessment (SOFA) score.97 Simply, each of
six organ systems, lungs, liver, brain, kidneys, blood clotting, and blood
pressure, is independently assigned a score of 1 to 4.98 The SOFA score
totals these six scores, with sicker patients generally being assigned higher
scores.99 Those with higher scores are placed behind those with lower
scores who are more likely to survive a medical intervention. The idea is
that wasting scarce healthcare resources on those less likely to survive is
an inefficient use of limited resources.100
In July 2020, a panel of experts from the American College of Chest
Physicians (CHEST) published principles of critical care triage to “direct
limited resources toward patients most likely to benefit from them” during
the COVID–19 crisis.101 These triage protocol guidelines are similarly

1–7 (June 19, 2020), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/
2767360.
95
Id.
96
HOWARD A. ZUCKER ET AL., N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW,
Ventilator Allocation Guidelines 1, 15 (2015), https://www.health.ny.gov/regulations/
task_force/reports_publications/docs/ventilator_guidelines.pdf.
97
The European Society of Intensive Care Medicine designed the SOFA score metric in
October 1994 in Paris, France. J.L. Vincent et.al, The SOFA (Sepsis–related Organ Failure
Assessment) score to describe organ dysfunction/failure, 22 INTENSIVE CARE MEDICINE
707–710 (1996).
98
“SOFA [is] based on six different scores, one for each of the respiratory,
cardiovascular, hepatic, coagulation, renal and neurological systems each scored from 0 to
4 with an increasing score reflecting worsening organ dysfunction.” Simon Lambden et al.,
The SOFA score—development, utility and challenges of accurate assessment in clinical
trials, 23 CRITICAL CARE 1, 2 (2019), https://ccforum.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.
1186/s13054–019–2663–7.pdf.
99
While not initially designed as a prognostic score, subsequent research supports its
use for that end. A.E. Jones et. al, The Sequential Organ Failure Assessment score for
predicting outcome in patients with severe sepsis and evidence of hypoperfusion at the time
of emergency department presentation, 37 CRITICAL CARE MED., 1649, 1652 (2009).
100
See generally Health Care System Surge Capacity Recognition, Preparedness, and
Response, AM. COLL. OF EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS (Oct. 2017), https://www.acep.org/
patient–care/policy–statements/health–care–system–surge–capacity–recognition–
preparedness–and–response/.
101
Ryan C. Maves et. al., Triage of Scarce Critical Care Resources in COVID–19 An
Implementation Guide for Regional Allocation, 158 CHEST 212, 212 (2020).
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designed to be implemented when “surge capacity”102 is exceeded and
there is a need to allocate scare medical resources.103
CHEST recommends the “use of tertiary triage, which takes place at
an acute care hospital when deciding whether or not to admit for critical
care services.”104 Generally, coronavirus patients will fit into one of three
tertiary triage categories: “(1) too well to benefit from critical care, (2) too
sick to benefit from critical care because of severe underlying illness or a
poor likelihood of surviving their hospitalization, or (3) sick enough to
benefit from critical care.”105 “The goal is not to exclude categories of
patients based on age or underlying co–morbidities and disease. Rather,
the goal of a triage protocol is to maximize the use of critical care resources
for patients in the third category.”106 “These categories apply to all patients
presenting with critical illness under crisis standards of care, not just those
infected with COVID 19.”107 CHEST concludes that it is necessary to
“recognize that patients less likely to benefit from critical care may not be
provided those services and interventions under a triage system.”108
However, referring to the practice of singular reliance on SOFA
scores, CHEST expressly recognizes that “protocols that explicitly
exclude patients based on a single criterion alone may run afoul of
antidiscrimination laws in many jurisdictions.”109 CHEST further
recommends against the use of SOFA scoring alone because “a growing
body of evidence suggests such scoring systems are unlikely to predict
critical care outcomes with sufficient accuracy, in particular patients
suffering from COVID 19, or be a useful basis for triage decisions based
on the current protocol cut points.”110
Medical ethicists likewise criticize the use of priority point systems
like SOFA for ignoring ethical values.111 Some argue that at “[a]ny patient

Compare AM. COLL. EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, supra note 100, at 1 (“Surge capacity
is a measurable representation of ability to manage a sudden influx of patients”) with NAT’L
ACAD. OF SCI., ENG’G, AND MED. supra note 86, at 2 (finding states should implement
protocols when it is “impossible” to meet healthcare standards).
103
AM. COLL. OF EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, supra note 100, at 1.
104
Id. at 217.
105
Id. at 217.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
See Harald Schmidt, The Way We Ration Ventilators is Biased, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/15/opinion/covid–ventilator–rationing–blacks.
html (noting that “[f]or example, creatinine levels, which reflect kidney function, vary
across income and racial groups. African–Americans, who have higher creatinine levels on
average, would be assigned a higher risk.”); Parag A. Pathak ET AL., Leaving No Ethical
102
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priority level, there is a potential that one priority group could completely
exhaust the remaining available resources leaving remaining patients
without access.”112
Still, Arizona, Florida, California, Georgia, Pennsylvania, and New
York rely on SOFA scoring as the single metric to justify rationing
healthcare during a healthcare emergency. Arizona is currently the only
state as of June 30, 2020, to actually initiate its rationing triage protocol in
response to the pandemic.113 A summary of Arizona’ CSC protocol and
those of other state national pandemic hotspots, including Florida,
California, Georgia, New York and Texas is provided in Appendix A. A
few of these states such as Pennsylvania have incorporated the CHEST
guidelines which provide operational steps to implement a triage system
within a state, county or jurisdiction.114

1. Pushback by State Activists Opposed to CSC SOFA
Scoring Metrics
Almost immediately after issuing triage protocols under CSC, several
states’ protocols were questioned by state disability activists. This resulted
in the Director of the HHS OCR declaring that the CSC protocols adopted
by two states, Washington and Alabama, discriminated against the
disabled.115 HHS expressly rejected any protocols that had the potential to
place “[p]ersons with disabilities, with limited English skills and older
persons . . . at the end of the line for health care during emergencies,”116
noting that new investigations would be conducted to ensure compliance
with civil right laws during the pandemic. The conclusion was not
predicated on any actual finding of intentional discrimination but rather
upon a determination that the guidelines subjected the disabled to unfair
Value Behind: Triage Protocol Design for Pandemic Rationing, 3 Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Rsch., Working Paper No. 26951, 2020), https://www.nber.org/papers/w26951.
112
Parag A. Pathak ET AL., supra note 111.
113
Michael Hiltzik, Arizona’s rules for rationing healthcare in the COVID–19 pandemic
should terrify you, L.A. TIMES (June 30, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/business
/story/2020–06–30/hiltzik–arizona–rationing–healthcare–coronavirus–covid–19.
114
Maves et al., supra note 101, at 213–215; Pennsylvania Dept. of Public Health, and
the Hospital and Health System Ass’n of Pennsylvania, Interim Pennsylvania Crisis
Standards of Care for Pandemic Guidelines Version 2 (April 10, 2020) at 7.
https://www.health.pa.gov/topics/Documents/Diseases%20and%20Conditions/COVID–
19%20Interim%20Crisis%20Standards%20of%20Care.pdf
115
Sheri Fink, U.S. Civil Rights Office Rejects Rationing Medical Care Based on
Disability, Age
N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 28, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/28/us/coronavirus–
disabilities–rationing–ventilators–triage.html.
116
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERV. OFF. FOR CIV. RTS. IN ACTION, BULLETIN:
CIVIL RIGHTS, HIPAA, AND THE CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 (COVID–19) (2020).
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and unequal treatment in the administration of the state respective
protocols.117 While not issuing a legal opinion, the language of the HHS
decision clearly implicated the right to equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Notably, not all states went even so far as to create CSC resource
allocation or rationing standards. On April 9, 2020, HHS published a
state–by–state listing of CSC guidelines.118 (Appendix A). HHS
determined that 17 states had no published guidelines or allocation
standards as of that date including, Alaska, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii,
Idaho, Indiana, Montana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Virginia, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
Only 13 states had devised standards in 2020 in direct response to
COVID–19 including, Alabama, California, Colorado, Florida, Kentucky,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,
Utah, and Washington.119 In several of these states, however, the
117

Laws that have a disparate impact are prohibited under the Civil Rights Act. OFF. CIV.
RTS., Civil Rights Requirements– A. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
2000d et seq. (“Title VI”), U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERV. (last reviewed July 26,
2013), https://www.hhs.gov/civil–rights/for–individuals/special–topics/needy–families/
civil–rights–requirements/index.html (“This prohibition applies to intentional
discrimination as well as to procedures, criteria or methods of administration that appear
neutral but have a discriminatory effect on individuals because of their race, color, or
national origin. Policies and practices that have such an effect must be eliminated unless a
recipient can show that they were necessary to achieve a legitimate nondiscriminatory
objective.”). The Supreme Court originated the theory of disparate–impact in the case
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). In Griggs, employees hired into service
jobs by the power company had to have a high school diploma and satisfy a minimum IQ
test score. Id. at 425–26. The plaintiffs argued that these two requirements
disproportionately disqualified blacks in the application process and thus violated Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employment discrimination based on race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. Id. The Supreme Court agreed, ruling that “job
criteria with an adverse or exclusionary effect on minorities — even if those criteria were
‘neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent’ — could violate the Title VII ban
on race discrimination in hiring.” Id. at 430. The Court further stipulated that employers
could avoid liability for “disparate impact” only if they “demonstrated that their adverse
selection practices had a manifest relationship to the employment in question” or that they
were justified by “business necessity.” Id. at 431, 432. The Supreme Court agreed, ruling
that “job criteria with an adverse or exclusionary effect on minorities — even if those
criteria were ‘neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent’ — could violate the
Title VII ban on race discrimination in hiring.” Amy L.Wax, The Dead End of “Disparate
Impact,” NAT’L AFFAIRS ( Summer 2012), https://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/
detail/the–dead–end–of–disparate–impact. The Court further stipulated that employers
could avoid liability for “disparate impact” only if they “demonstrated that their adverse
selection practices had a manifest relationship to the employment in question” or that they
were justified by “business necessity.” Id.
118
State Level Crisis Standards of Care, supra note 6.
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government did not devise any CSC protocols. Instead, as in the case of
Florida, a private nongovernmental organization stepped in to create an
informal voluntary plan endorsed by the Florida Hospital Association
when the state government failed to act.120
Other states merely adopted pre–COVID plans drafted between 2008
and 2019 which had not been updated to consider many of the novel health
issues raised by the pandemic including, Arizona, Connecticut,
Washington D.C., Illinois, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New
Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, and Vermont.121 Texas was not
mentioned in the HHS publication.
It is worth noting that in those states that have no CSC guidelines at
all, the decision regarding allocation of limited resources to presenting
COVID–19 patients remains based on individual, arbitrary healthcare
provider guidelines and are not afforded the limited liability protections
discussed above.122 These states have no emergency guidelines for
rationing care or otherwise limiting liability for pandemic related injuries.
In addition to many states choosing not to formally design and/or
implement CSC protocols, only few have immunity shield provisions
included as part of the CSC protocol. As noted previously, several of these
immunity shield provisions are implemented by statute and others are
facilitated using the issuance of an executive order. The next section
considers if there is legal authority to substitute a patient’s legal right to
sue with a provider immunity shield whether by executive order or by state
statute.

B.
Can the States Immunize Healthcare Providers from Tort
Liability Using Executive Orders and/or Legislation?
For those states that have not acted to provide a CSC protocol, leaving
scarce resource allocation to the absolute discretion of the providers, there
is seemingly no immunity shield to protect providers during the pandemic
for claims arising out of rationing and/or limiting access to healthcare.
Indeed, the research discloses no legal authority allowing providers to
arbitrarily remove and reallocate a lifesaving ventilator from one patient
to give it to another.123
Conceivably, rationing care or limiting access to care could give rise
to claims of intentional tort and/or gross negligence liability as well as
120

Christine Sexton, Hospital Group Backs Guidelines For Use Of Ventilators During
Coronavirus Peak, WUSF PUBLIC MEDIA (Apr. 14, 2020, 12:01 AM), https://health.
wusf.usf.edu/health–news–florida/2020–04–14/hospital–group–backs–guidelines–for–use
–of–ventilators–during–coronavirus–peak.
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State Level Crisis Standards of Care, supra note 6.
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See DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERV., supra note 33; CMS, supra note 19.
123
Liddell et al., supra note 49.
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medical malpractice.124 The history of the development of tort common
law and more recent cases where states have attempted to substitute
liability waivers for common law tort remedies are instructive here.

C.

Common Law and State Constitutional Prohibitions

There is little at the Common Law to support restricting a citizen’s
right to redress grievances in a court of law. Indeed, Chief Justice
Marshal125 stated in 1803 that: “The government of the United States has
been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will
certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no
remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.”126 Quoting Blackstone127
he continued: “it is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a
legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law, whenever
that right is invaded.”128 It appears that one of the major reasons for the
existence of such civil law remedies is to make injured parties whole and
to deter corporate and private misbehavior.
Marshal illuminated a deeply embedded principle in the Common Law
tradition dating back to at least the Magna Carta. In England, the monarch
had very broad powers including the power of dispensation and the power
of pardon. Using the power of dispensation, the monarch could, with some
limitation, relieve a person’s obligation to comply with a statute.129
However, the monarch could not suspend a law related to whole classes of
people, nor could he/she excuse persons from Common Law
obligations.130 The monarch likewise had no power to dispense if in doing
so it would deprive another of recourse to a private suit or action. 131 For
example, the monarch could pardon a person accused or found guilty of

DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERV. OFFICE FOR CIV. RTS. IN ACTION, supra note 11.
John Marshall was the fourth Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, serving from
1801 to 1835. Marshall made the Supreme Court an important institution of government,
deciding many important cases during his tenure, among them Marbury v. Madison, which
stood for and provide the country with judicial review. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137
(1803).
126
Id. at 163.
127
Id. (citing THE COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, an influential 18th–century
treatise on the common law of England by Sir William Blackstone).
128
Id. at 121.
129
The Magna Carta is a charter of rights signed by King John of England on June 15,
1215. See Sir Edward Coke, The Reports of Sir Edward Coke (1602), in THE SELECTED
WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD COKE 37, 40 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003).
130
Paul Birdsall, “Non Obstante” A Study of the Dispending Power of English Kings, in
ESSAYS IN HISTORY AND POLITICAL THEORY IN HONOR OF CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN
(Carl Wittke ed., 1967).
131
John C. P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the
Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 540 (2005).
124
125
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murder but could not stop interested parties from suing for compensation
for the legal wrong.132
In the Commentaries, Blackstone 133
. . . defines a private wrong as a breach of a duty owed by
the wrongdoer to the victim and, hence, a mistreatment of
(“injury to”) the victim by the wrongdoer. For this class
of wrong, Blackstone explained, the law confers on the
victim (or his or her survivors) a special privilege to
respond to the wrongdoing, consisting typically of a
power to invoke the writ of trespass or case to obtain
damages from the wrongdoer. This power, Blackstone
insisted, is not “merely” a common law entitlement, but
rather a right guaranteed by England’s unwritten
constitution.134
The Enlightenment thinker, John Locke, whose writing influenced
both the design of the U.S. Constitution and its Declaration of
Independence, in his Second Treatise on Government, likewise “insisted
that the sovereign has no authority to extinguish a victim’s claim to
recourse against an injurer.”135
The early American Colonies inherited the Common Law tradition of
redressing legal wrongs by suing in tort. Most of the original states like
Delaware, New Hampshire, Maryland, Massachusetts, and Vermont,
included such rights in their early constitutions, respectively.136
Yet, in the nineteenth century during a national crisis, some state
legislatures attempted to eliminate the state constitutional rights of citizens
to redress legal grievances in the courts. For example, during the Civil
War, the Minnesota legislature passed a law that foreclosed “all persons
aiding the rebellion against the United States” the right to file a lawsuit in
state courts.137 The state supreme court struck it down, saying:
We would never for one moment suppose that the
Legislature has the power under the constitution, to
132

Id. at 540–541.
Sir William Blackstone (10 July 1723 – 14 February 1780) was an English legal
scholar, or jurist, judge and politician of the eighteenth century. He is most well–known
for writing the Commentaries on the Laws of England.
134
Goldberg, supra note 133, at 549.
135
Id. at 541; see also id. n.80.
136
See DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. I, § 9; MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS AND CONST. of
1776, art. XVII; MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. XI; N.H. CONST. of 1784, art. 14; VT. CONST.
of 1786, art. IV.
137
Davis v. Pierse, 7 Minn. 13, 15 (1862).
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deprive a person or class of persons, of the right of trial
by jury, or to subject them to imprisonment for debt, or
their persons, houses, papers and effects, to unreasonable
searches; or their property to be taken for public use
without just compensation; and yet neither of these is
more sacred to the citizen, or more carefully guarded by
the constitution, than the right to have a certain and
prompt remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs to
person, property or character.138
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution operates hand in
hand with state constitutional due process mandates prohibiting states
from enacting statutes negating the right of the citizenry to redress
grievances in the courts.

D.
The Fourteenth Amendment Right to Due Process and
Equal Protection
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution was “meant to
guarantee that states would attend to basic obligations, including the duty
to provide law for the redress of wrongs, and that federal courts were
meant to enforce that guarantee.”139 The right to the equal protection of the
law includes the right to use the law; namely, the courts, to protect those
rights, to redress wrongs suffered by the citizenry. The Supreme Court of
the United States, in describing the rights afforded by the Fourteenth
Amendment, observed: “all the privileges of the English Magna Charta in
favor of freemen are collected upon him and overshadow him as derived
from this amendment. The States must not weaken nor destroy them.” 140
Thus, any citizen of any state is protected against what any state might
do which is inconsistent with the guarantees of the U.S. Constitution,
including the deprivation of the right to redress a grievance. Indeed, in
providing the litany of citizen protected rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment, Justice Story, in a case arising under a New Jersey Statute,
included, “those privileges and immunities which are, in their nature,
fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free
governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of
the several states which compose this Union . . . to institute and maintain
138

Id. at 18.
Goldberg, supra note 126, at 564; see also id. at 564 n.198 (citing an argument made
in William E. Nelson, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO
JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (1988) “that Section 1 identified federal rights against state
interference while placing significant responsibility for enforcement of those rights on the
states.”
140
Slaughter–House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 54 (1872).
139
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actions of any kind in the courts of the state . . . which are clearly embraced
by the general description of privileges deemed to be fundamental . . . .141
Again, in 1885, the Supreme Court emphasized that “[i]t is the duty of
every State to provide, in the administration of justice, for the redress of
private wrongs . . . .”142
Despite the historic roots of the common law right to redress
grievances in the courts and the Fourteenth Amendment, a few state courts
have found an exception. Generally, these state courts have held that legal
access guarantee to redress grievances is not absolute under the
constitution and may not necessarily restrain state legislatures from acting
to at least limit access under certain circumstances by statute.143

E.
State Legislation and the Attempt to Provide a Pandemic
Liability Shield
Unlike many other states examined for this paper, New York’s
statutory law is unique in that it invests the governor with broad executive
powers to suspend generally all laws if determined to be necessary by the
governor in an emergency.144 Despite this grant of power, New York’s
governor chose not to exercise executive authority and did not issue an
executive order to provide healthcare providers with a pandemic immunity
shield. Instead, the governor was accused of “burying” a statutory
provision as an addendum attached to a piece of proposed budget
legislation, that some lawmakers claimed they failed to see when passing
the budget legislation.145 This legislative addendum granted immunity to
all healthcare facilities and health care workers “from any liability, civil
or criminal, for any harm or damages alleged to have been sustained as a
result of an act or omission in the course of arranging for or providing
health care services . . . .”146
There is some case law in New York to support the constitutionality
of the issuance of such immunity by statute. In the context of constitutional

141

Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F.Cas. 546, 551–52 (Cir. Ct. E.D. Pa. 1823).
Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 521 (1885).
143
David Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 65 TEMPLE L. REV. 1197, 1204 (1992);
Meech v. Hillhaven West, Inc., 776 P.2d 488, 491–97 (Mont. 1989).
144
2021 N.Y. Exec § 29–A (Consol. 2021).
145
Madison Dibble, New York Budget Provision Bars Families From Suing Nursing
Homes over Coronavirus Response, THE WASHINGTON EXAMINER (Mar. 14, 2020),
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/new–york–budget–provision–bars–families–
from–suing–nursing–homes–over–coronavirus–response (The headline and article focuses
on nursing homes, but the immunity goes much farther.).
146
S. 7506–B, 2019–2020 Sen. Assemb. (N.Y. 2020), https://www.nysenate.gov/legis
lation/bills/2019/s7506 (The language appeared on page 347 of a 362–page budget bill
submitted to the New York State Assembly by the office of the governor.).
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construction, New York’s Court of Appeals observed147 that “[the] police
power of the State is the least limitable of all the powers of
government.”148 In interpreting whether a statute violates the right of
access to courts, the highest court of New York observed that when a
statute is challenged on nonprocedural grounds as violative of due process
of law, the court considers whether there is “‘some fair, just and reasonable
connection’ between the language of the statute and the promotion of the
health, comfort, safety and welfare of society.”149 Thus, a legitimate
exercise of state police power does not offend the Fourteenth Amendment
right to due process which is not deemed to be absolute. Notably, the New
York state immunity provision has still to be tested in the courts to
determine if this immunity shield constitutes a legitimate exercise of
police power.
Illinois follows suit but in a more restrictive manner. Section 12 of the
Bill of Rights of the Illinois Constitution provides that: “Every person shall
find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs which he
receives to his person, privacy, property or reputation. He shall obtain
justice by law, freely, completely, and promptly.”150 In analyzing statutes
that limit access to courts, the Illinois Supreme Court warns that “(c)ourts
should begin any constitutional analysis with the presumption that the
challenged legislation is constitutional and it is the plaintiff’s burden to
clearly establish that the challenged provisions are unconstitutional.” 151
The court, in striking down a law that limited plaintiff tort actions, held
that “the Illinois constitution is a limitation, not a grant of legislative
power.152 It is this court’s duty to interpret the law and to protect the rights
of individuals against acts beyond the scope of the legislative power.”153
So while not an absolute prohibition, statutes limiting access to courts are
not favored in Illinois.
Despite this warning, the Illinois legislature enacted The Illinois
Emergency Management Agency Act (IEMA).154 This Act grants the
governor wide executive authority to act in the event of a state emergency,
such as an epidemic,155 and shields healthcare workers from liability
except in cases of gross negligence or willful misconduct.156 Thus, under
147

The Court of Appeal is the highest court in the court system of the state of New York.
A. E. Nettleton Co. v. Diamond, 27 N.Y.2d 182, 192 (1970) (quoting Mater of
Engelsher v. Jacobs, 5 N.Y. 2d 370, 373 (1959)).
149
Id. at 193 (quoting People v. Bunis, 9 N.Y.2d 1, 4 (1961)).
150
IL. CONST. art. I, § 12.
151
Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 179 Ill.2d 367, 377 (1997).
152
Id. at 377.
153
Id.
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127 ILL. COMP. STAT. 3305/1 (2021).
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Id.
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Id. at § 15.
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the powers granted in the IEMA, the Illinois governor issued an executive
order safeguarding healthcare worker against liability during the
pandemic.157
In that order, the governor directs:
Section 3 . . . that during the pendency of the
Gubernatorial Disaster Proclamation, Health Care
Facilities . . . shall be immune from civil liability for any
injury or death alleged to have been caused by any act or
omission by the Health Care Facility, which injury or
death occurred at a time when a Health Care Facility was
engaged in the course of rendering assistance to the State
by providing health care services in response to the
COVID–19 outbreak, unless it is established that such
injury or death was caused by gross negligence or willful
misconduct of such Health Care Facility . . . or by willful
misconduct . . . .
Section 4. . . . that during the pendency of the
Gubernatorial Disaster Proclamations, Health Care
Professionals, as defined in Section 1 of this Executive
Order, shall be immune from civil liability for any injury
or death alleged to have been caused by any act or
omission by the Health Care Professional, which injury or
death occurred at a time when a Health Care Professional
was engaged in the course of rendering assistance to the
State by providing health care services in response to the
COVID–19 outbreak, unless it is established that such
injury or death was caused by gross negligence or willful
misconduct of such Health Care Professional . . . or by
willful misconduct . . . .158
Additionally, the Maryland state statute, Public Safety Title 14 –
Emergency Management Subtitle 3A – Governor’s Health Emergency
Powers, allows the governor to first proclaim159 a health emergency, and
then subsequently issue orders.160 Such executive orders, in the event of a
157

Rich Miller, Gov. Pritzker Shields Health Care Workers from Lawsuits During
Coronavirus Pandemic, CHICAGO SUN TIMES (Apr. 3, 2020), https://chicago.suntimes
.com/columnists/2020/4/3/21207614/coronavirus–covid–19–j–b–pritzker–health–care–
workers–illinois–emergency–management–agency.
158
IL. EXEC. ORDER No. 2020–19 § 3–4, (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www2.illinois.gov
/Pages/Executive–Orders/ExecutiveOrder2020–19.aspx.
159
MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 14–3A–03 (West 2021).
160
Id.
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health emergency, can include both testing and vaccination mandates. By
statute, citizens failing to comply with the executive order can be isolated
and quarantined by the governor.161 Knowing and willful violations of any
such orders is a criminal offense.162
In another unique twist in state law interpretation, both a Maryland
attorney general’s opinion163 and an opinion issued by the Maryland court
of appeals have concluded that an executive order issued by the governor
has the effect of law in Maryland.164
Despite the liberality of powers conferred on the executive branch,
Maryland’s lawmakers chose to pass legislation including an immunity
shield provision providing that: “A health care provider is immune from
civil or criminal liability if the health care provider acts in good faith and
under a catastrophic health emergency proclamation.”165 Again, what is
“good faith” is not well defined and does not refer specifically to
healthcare resource rationing.
Finally, Pennsylvania is an interesting example that can be viewed as
somewhat legally mystifying. In May 2020, the governor signed an
executive order providing civil immunity for “good faith” actions to
specified health care providers.166 The order likewise suspended several
regulatory requirements relating to in–state activity for out of state
licensed health care workers; along with certain in–home health care
activities, and who can be health service supervisors.167 The immunity
provisions provided in pertinent part that designated healthcare workers:
shall be immune from civil liability and shall not be liable
for the death of or any injury to a person or for loss of or
damage to property as a result of the emergency services
activity or disaster services activity described above,
161

Id.; MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 14–3A–05 (West 2021).
MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 14–3A–08 (West 2021).
163
Robert A. Zarnoch, Gubernatorial Executive Orders: Legislative or Executive
Power?, 44 MD. B. J. 48, 51 (2011).
164
Dept. of Pub. Safety & Corr. Serv. v. Beard, 790 A.2d 57, 65 (2002) (Dealing with an
order for certain employees to engage in collective bargaining, which does not address the
specific issue raised by denial of access to healthcare resources. It is, however, instructive
by analogy.).
165
MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 14–3A–06 (West 2021).
166
Press Release, Governor Tom Wolf, Gov. Wolf Signs Executive Order to Provide
Civil Immunity for Health Care Providers (May 06, 2020), https://www.governor
.pa.gov/newsroom/gov–wolf–signs–executive–order–to–provide–civil–immunity–for–
health–care–providers/.
167
Governor Tom Wolf, ORDER OF THE GOVERNOR OF THE COMMONWEALTH
OF PENNSYLVANIA TO ENHANCE PROTECTIONS FOR HEALTH CARE
PROFESSIONALS, (May 6, 2020), https://www.governor.pa.gov/wp–content/uploads/
2020/05/20200506–GOV–health–care–professionals–protection–order–COVID–19.pdf.
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except in the cases of willful misconduct or gross
negligence, to the fullest extent permitted by law. This
grant of immunity shall not extend to health care
professionals rendering non–COVID–19 medical and
health treatment or services to individuals.168
Thereafter, the Pennsylvania legislature passed a statute replacing this
executive order that “would have temporarily extended civil liability
protection to hospitals, nursing homes, schools, businesses,
manufacturers, and other entities but like the executive order would have
offered no protection against claims for gross negligence or willful
misconduct.”169 In response to the substitution of his executive order by a
state statute, the governor opposed the statutory version of the immunity
shield claiming that he believed that the bill went too far and would “invite
carelessness and disregard for public safety.”170
However, based on a brief review of the Pennsylvania state
constitution and the case history attendant to the issuance of executive
orders, the actions of the Pennsylvania state legislature are not surprising.
First, the Pennsylvania Constitution provides: “All courts shall be open;
and every man for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or
reputation shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice
administered without sale, denial or delay. Suits may be brought against
the Commonwealth in such manner, in such courts and in such cases as
the Legislature may by law direct.”171
Later in 2003, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court172 declared that
people, including prisoners in the prison system “have a fundamental
constitutional right of access to the courts.”173 The court argued that to find
otherwise would be in violation of the First and the Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. 174 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court stated that it did away with the quid pro quo notion that if the law
took away a remedy, it provided one in return. Still, the Court did not find
its declaration to be an absolute prohibition and applied a balancing test:
168

Id.
Jolena Jeffrey, Pennsylvania Governor Vetoes Bill Extending Reach of Business
Liability Protections During COVID–19, NAT’L L. REV. (Feb. 17, 2021), https://www.
natlawreview.com/article/pennsylvania–governor–vetoes–bill–extending–reach–
business–liability–protections.
170
Id.
171
PA. CONST. art. 1, § 11.
172
The Commonwealth Court is one of two intermediate appellate courts in
Pennsylvania.
173
Bronson v. Horn, 830 A.2d 1092, 1094 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003) (quoting Bounds v.
Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977)).
174
See id.
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whether the state had a substantial state interest in foregoing the remedy
contrary to the remedies clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution. It thus
concluded that the right of access set forth in the remedies clause was no
longer a fundamental right, but still an important one. Accordingly, in such
cases, the court applies the constitutional intermediate scrutiny test:
[t]his standard of review requires that the government
interest be an ‘important’ one; that the classification be
drawn so as to be closely related to the objectives of the
legislation; and that the person excluded from an
important right or benefit be permitted to challenge his
exclusion on the grounds that in his particular case, denial
of the right or benefit would not promote the purpose of
the classification.175
As early as 1973, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania referred a
separation of powers dispute between the governor and the state legislature
observing that, absent a statutory enactment providing for it, the governor
did not have the authority to order an action or even sue in court even to
enjoin activity contrary to constitutional non–self–executing
language.176Additionally, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained that
the state constitution provides for a clear separation of powers, with checks
and balances to prevent a concentration of power in any one branch, and
to ensure that one branch would not exercise the functions of another.177
Though the executive authority of the governor is not recognized in the
Pennsylvania Constitution, the Court nonetheless held that “the Governor
may issue executive orders” but they “must not infringe upon the powers
of the other two branches of our government . . . .”178
Thus, in Pennsylvania, “. . . executive orders (can) be classified into
three permissible types: (1) proclamations for ceremonial purposes; (2)
directives to subordinate officials for the execution of executive branch
duties; and (3) interpretation of statutory or other law.”179 However,
executive orders are not legally enforceable and so the courts have held.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in approving an executive order found
that it was not an enforceable order, so that it did not encroach on the
purviews of the other branches, and so “. . . while such an order may not
be legally enforceable, it nevertheless is permissible as a gubernatorial
175

Smith v. City of Philadelphia, 516 A.2d 306, 311 (1986).
Commonwealth by Shapp v. Nat’l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, 311 A.2d 588, 590–
95 (Pa. 1973).
177
Markham v. Wolf, 190 A.3d 1175, 1177 (Pa. 2018).
178
Id. at 656.
179
Id. at 1180.
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act,”180 and such orders are allowed to stand. This appears to be yet another
pyrrhic victory for the governor who can issue executive orders that cannot
be enforced.
Accordingly, the foregoing states have attempted by legislation to
create a pandemic liability shield limiting the common law and/or state
constitutional guarantees of a legal access to the courts in the case of
pandemic related injuries. Still, none of these statutory provisions have
been challenged in the courts. The next section considers whether this
same principle applies with equal force to executive orders issued by
respective state governors where not otherwise authorized by the state
constitution or state statute.

F.
Gubernatorial Executive Orders Providing Immunity
Shields Raise Enforceability Issues181
There are several questions that need to be answered before reaching
a conclusion regarding the legal effect of state executive orders providing
an immunity shield. First, is the state governor legally authorized to issue
an executive order? If so, what does the state law allow a governor to do
in terms of limiting a citizen’s right to redress legal grievances? In the case
of medical emergencies such as the pandemic, are state executive orders
enforceable having the clear legal effect of immunizing or shielding
healthcare providers from tort liability?
Logic might dictate that if the federal government felt the need to enact
legislation in the form of the Safe to Work Act to achieve a measure of
provider immunity, then states would have to take a similar path. But as
previously noted, many states have instead opted to adopt CSC protocols
by means of an executive order issued by the governor. Nearly every
180

Id. at 1185.
David Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1197, 1201 n. 25 (finding
that 39 states provide a guarantee of access to the courts for their citizens, either by means
of explicit language in their constitution or by judicial finding); Arguably, if a governor,
through executive order or otherwise, denies access to the courts to a state’s citizens, such
action may give rise to a constitutional objection of unlawful usurpation of power under
the separation of powers doctrine. Even though state constitutions may provide such a right,
there appears currently no federal counterpart to such guarantees. See, e.g., id. at 1199 (The
Magna Carta was specific: “every Subject of this Realm, for injury done to him in [goods,
land or person] . . . may take his remedy by the course of the Law, and have justice and
right for the injury done him, freely without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily
without delay.” However, despite its central role in Anglo–American Common Law at the
time, it did not make it into the Bill of Rights to the U.S. Constitution. However, as pointed
out, many states did include the concept in several state constitutions.); The Supreme Court
of Alaska has stated “that a ‘legal right’ exists only so long as one may obtain redress
through the court system. Patrick v. Lynden Transport, Inc., 765 P.2d 1375, 1379 (Alaska
1988).
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state’s law allows for a governor to issue executive orders. However, no
one size fits all and states have differing gauges on whether executive
orders have the force of law, whether they expire automatically, and/or the
role of legislative oversight over such orders. As noted above,
Pennsylvania allows the governor to issue executive orders which are
legally non–enforceable.
Accordingly, a governor’s power to issue executive orders in most
states originates by authority embedded in the state’s constitution, statutes
or case law, or by some combination of them.182 Sometimes, it is simply
implied by the broad powers afforded the governor by the state
constitution.183 Governors use executive orders for a range of reasons,184
chiefly among them to:
Activate emergency powers during disasters,
energy calamities, and other conditions that require
immediate attention;
Create advisory or investigative commissions;
and
Deal with administrative matters, including
regulatory reform, intergovernmental coordination,
environmental impact and discrimination.185
See Appendix B for a synopsis of the states that provide authority to
the governor to issue executive orders and the source of such authority
under each state’s law.
For example, Connecticut’s constitution provides that: “All courts
shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person,
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right
and justice administered without sale, denial or delay.” 186 However,
Connecticut’s governor recently issued an executive order on April 5,
2020 that provided for broad protection against civil liability for health
care providers, individuals and facilities, except for “acts or omissions that
constitute a crime, fraud, malice, gross negligence, willful

Governors’ Powers & Authorities, NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, https://www.nga.org/
governors/powers–and–authority/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2021).
183
Id.
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
CONN. CONST. art. I, § 10.
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misconduct . . . .”187 A few days later he clarified that such immunity
extended for both common law claims or statute–based claims.188
However, the use of an executive order in Connecticut to accomplish
pandemic tort immunity arguably flies in the face of established case law
which confines that type of power to the state legislature. The Connecticut
Supreme Court held: “it is within the province of the legislature to redefine
or abolish existing definitions of injury . . . .”189Thus, “the right of redress
for injury is constitutional in its nature but the nature of a specific injury
is a right derived from the common law or statute.”190 Accordingly, it is
questionable whether an executive order emanates from an “authority
having jurisdiction” as that term is explained in the Opinion interpreting
the PREP Act immunity provisions.191 and whether it is even enforceable.
This also raises the specter of yet another interesting separation of powers
dispute between the legislature and the governor.
Likewise, the PREP pre–emption exclusion, discussed above,
provides that “no State or political subdivision of a State may establish,
enforce, or continue in effect with respect to a covered countermeasure
any provision of law or legal requirement that is different from, or is in
conflict with, any requirement applicable under this section.”192 The
statutory pre–emption exclusion makes clear that patients’ legal rights
were not intended to be suspended or otherwise pre–empted by state or
local laws in conflict with PREP during the crisis.193 That which is deemed
to be consistent with PREP and that which is deemed to be in conflict with
PREP remains undefined and untested. Arguably, the opposing legal
authority in a state such as Connecticut which brings into question its own
endorsement of the enforceability of the governor’s executive order,
would support an argument that the countermeasure is not sanctioned by
the state and is therefore, inconsistent with the PREP pre–emption
exclusion.
In another example, Wyoming’s constitution assures citizens the right
to redress in the courts: “All courts shall be open and every person for an
injury done to person, reputation or property shall have justice
administered without sale, denial or delay. Suits may be brought against
the state in such manner and in such courts as the legislature may by law
187
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direct.”194 This constitution does not confer authority on the governor to
even issue executive orders. The Supreme Court of Wyoming, in a case
respecting a governor’s appointment—another type of order—observed
that “(h)e [the governor] has only such power in that connection as is
granted him by the constitution and the statutes of this state. If the law
requires him to act in conjunction with another body, he cannot evade such
provision.”195
Even though the Wyoming constitution does not specifically authorize
gubernatorial executive orders, and notwithstanding the foregoing case
precedent, the Wyoming governor issued an order declaring a Covid
emergency and a subsequent order implementing measures to deal with
the emergency. However, that order merely directed other state agencies
to “take all appropriate and necessary” actions to deal with the
emergency.196 But the public interpreted the governor’s order to provide a
far broader immunity shield. For example, according to the Cowboy State
News Network, “Governor Gordon’s Executive Order ensures the State
Health Officer has the authority to address large–scale health challenges
the state may face in the future.”197 The breadth and enforceability of the
somewhat ambiguous Wyoming governor’s order remains to be tested not
only at the state level but also in the context of PREP and the Fourteenth
Amendment.
On the other hand, Kentucky law is more restrictive than most states
examined in this paper. Kentucky’s Court of Appeals explained how and
to what extent the state’s governor was vested with the power of issuing
executive orders:
The office of Governor is unknown to the common law.
It is the title universally applied to the head of the
executive department of a state, but in every instance the
office is created by the State Constitution. Section 69 of
our Constitution creates the office of Governor and vests
in him the supreme executive powers of the
commonwealth. He has only such powers as the
Constitution and Statutes, enacted pursuant thereto, vest
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WYO. CONST. art. I, § 7.
People ex rel. Warren v. Christian, 123 P.2d 368, 371 (Wyo. 1942).
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Wyo. Governor Mark Gordon, Exec. Order 2020–2, Declaration of a State of
Emergency and Public Health Emergency, STATE OF WYO. EXEC. DEP ’T (Mar. 13, 2020),
https://content.govdelivery.com/attachments/WYGOV/2020/03/13/file_attachments/1400
574/Executive%20Order%202020–2.pdf.
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Angi Beauheim, Governor Gordon Signs Emergency Declaration, COWBOY STATE
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in him, and those powers must be exercised in the manner
and within the limitations therein prescribed.198
Kentucky’s courts have been reluctant to recognize implied powers or
expand on those specifically granted to the governor.199
Nonetheless, Kentucky’s governor recently issued a variety of
executive orders for the ostensible purpose of protecting the health and
safety of the citizens of the state200 during the pandemic based upon a claim
that such authority was granted to the governor under state statute.201
However, these executive orders do not expressly create an immunity
shield for healthcare providers in the state and thus, do not necessarily
implicate the access issue addressed in this paper.
Parenthetically, the Kentucky courts have so far upheld challenges to
pre–pandemic executive orders issued by the governor.202 It remains
unclear how the courts would rule if an immunity shield were included in
an executive order, however.
From these examples it is apparent that while the early state
constitutional drafters, courts and legislators were wary of giving the
governors broad and unforeseen powers, there has been considerable
backsliding on this view by more recent drafters of state constitutions, by
legislators and even by some state courts. One explanation for this
loosening of legal constraints on the governor is that states have
recognized, particularly during an unanticipated pandemic, that certain
societal dangers greatly impact the health, safety and welfare of the state
citizenry and that decisive leadership on the part of the executive is
necessary in such an emergent situation.
However, the contours of executive authority during a life–threatening
emergency such as the pandemic remain untested. Where not previously
authorized by state statute and/or contrary to existing state constitutional
provisions guaranteeing access to the courts to redress grievances, the
likelihood of the enforceability of executive orders granting an immunity
198
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shield remains questionable at best. At the very least questions regarding
the separation of powers between state legislative and executive branches
loom in the dispute. Still, even those rights that the Supreme Court of the
United States and state supreme courts have declared to be fundamental
rights—including those found in the Bill of Rights—are not absolute.203
This notion has led the courts to engage in a balancing act observing that
“(a) balance must be struck between a government’s obligations to protect
its citizens and those citizens’ exercise of their rights.”204 The question can
only be resolved when ultimately balanced by the courts on a case–by–
case basis.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The pandemic has had a profound global affect in every aspect of
human life. Perhaps once the dust settles and the consequences of
respective state government action become clearer, litigation may follow
to seek clarification of this question of first impression under the law:
Whether the right to institute suit for pandemic related healthcare injuries
can be constitutionally eliminated using state triage protocol immunity
provisions passed by executive order or by state statute during the
pandemic.
Little wonder that some health care providers are cautious. The virus
has been an unforeseen and complicated challenge, not made easier by the
confusion of the federal and state governmental responses, respectively,
particularly in the field of tort immunity for health service providers. The
federal government has attempted legislation, regulations and
pronouncements, some of which interconnect in a confusing manner, and
leave puzzling lacunae. Many states have, in turn, dispensed a variety of
attempts, many of which—along with the jumbled federal action—have,
it can be argued, gone far in the restraint of individual rights and/or created
separation of powers issues.
As stated above, the right to a citizen’s access to the court to redress
grievances is a long–standing Common Law tradition and enshrined in
many state constitutions. As a practical matter, nearly all tort actions are
filed in state courts. Several state courts have been creative in devising
balancing schemes or constitutional tests for interpreting when to craft
203

See, for example, Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 408–09 (2007) (for a discussion
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exceptions to the guarantee of access to courts to redress legal grievances.
Numerous state courts follow the lead of the U.S. Supreme Court205 in
finding a way around the constitutional right of access, and many state
courts use arrangements based on terminology designed by federal courts,
such as “fundamental rights,” legitimate exercise of police power, and
“intermediate scrutiny.”206
Other schemes rely on the idea that the legislature cannot eliminate or
modify the right without providing a quid pro quo.207 Other courts appear
to use a balancing test, which leads a court to renounce statutory
restrictions that are deemed unreasonable or arbitrary.208 In addition, there
are courts that say that the access guarantee does not restrain legislation. 209
Accordingly, despite respective state constitutional bills of rights,
despite governors’ constitutional powers and despite judicial precedent, it
is unclear what a state court might legally do given the Covid–19
pandemic. The ultimate legal resolution will depend on the courts. The
paper concludes that healthcare providers may still be subject to some
legal liability for pandemic related tort claims depending upon each state’s
unique constitutional grant of powers to the executive and legislative
branches and the guarantees of due process and equal protection under the
dictates of the Fourteenth Amendment.
205

In interpreting the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to a statute, the Supreme
Court of the United States stated that “Liberty under the Constitution is thus necessarily
subject to the restraints of due process, and regulation which is reasonable in relation to its
subject and is adopted in **582 the interests of the community is due process.” W. Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937).
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Schuman, supra note 144, at 1204.
207
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Appendix A: Comparison of available state–level Crisis Standards
of Care (CSC)
Technical Resources, Assistance Center, and Information Exchange
(TRACIE). State Level Crisis Standards of Care. US Department of Health
and Human Services: Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response
(ASPR). April 2020. (Accessed April 15, 2020 at https://files
.asprtracie.hhs. gov/documents/4–9–20–state–level–csc–plans–guidance–
policy.pdf).
State

Existence of
CSC*

Date of
identified
document
**

Explic
it
ethical
frame
work

Health
equity
as a
guiding
princip
le

Explicitl
y
identityblind
allocatio
n of
resourc
es

Alabama

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas

Yes
Yes
None
identified
Yes
Yes
Yes
None
identified
None
identified
None
identified
None
identified
No–in
developme
nt
Yes

4/2010;
2/2020
3/2020
2020

No
Yes

No
No

No
Yes

4/2020++
4/2020++
10/2010

Yes
No
Yes

No
No
Yes

Yes
No
Yes

3/2018;
3/2020++

Yes

No

Yes

California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho

Illinois
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Indiana
Iowa

Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachuse
tts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana

Nebraska
Nevada
New
Hampshire
New Jersey
New
Mexico
New York
North
Carolina
North
Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon

None
identified
No–in
developme
nt
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
None
identified
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No–in
developme
nt
None
identified
Yes
None
identified
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
None
identified
Yes+++
Yes
Yes
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9/2013
3/2020
9/2011
6/2015

No
Yes
Yes
No

No
Yes
Yes
No

No
Yes
No
No

4/2020++

Yes

Yes

Yes

11/2012
12/2013;
1/2020
2/2017
4/2020++

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

No
No

No
No

4/2020++

Yes

Yes

No

4/2020++
6/2018

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

11/2015

Yes

Yes

Yes

4/2020
4/2020
6/2018

Yes
Yes
Yes

No
No
Yes

No
Yes
Yes
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Pennsylvani
a
Rhode
Island
South
Carolina
South
Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia

Washington
West
Virginia
Wisconsin

Wyoming

Yes
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4/20202

Yes

Yes

Yes

7/2016

Yes

No

Yes

6/2018
5/2019

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

3/2020

Yes

Yes

Yes

6/2019

No

No

No

No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No–in
development
Yes
No–in
development
No–in
developme
nt
Yes

*CSC Crisis Standards of Care
**
As of May 3, 2020
+

Specific guidance for critical care and ventilator allocation in 2010;
2/2020 document provides broader guidance
++
Specific guidance related to the COVID–19 pandemic
+++
Guidelines obtained from the Ohio Hospital Association through
correspondence with the Ohio Department of Health’s Chief of the Bureau
of Health Preparedness
Appendix B: Gubernatorial Executive Orders: Authorizations,
Provisions, Procedures
Source: The Council of State Governments survey of governors’
offices, April 2019
The Book of States 2019 http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/category
/content–type/bos–2019
Table 4.5 at 112–113.
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Footnotes to chart:
Key:
C—Constitutional
S—Statutory
I—Implied
—Formal provision.
. . . —No formal provision.
(a) Broad interpretation of gubernatorial authority. In Arizona, the
governor is authorized to make executive orders in all of these areas and
situations so long as there is not a conflicting statute in place.
(b) Executive orders must be filed with secretary of state or other
designated officer.
(c) Authorization implied from constitution and statute as recognized
by 63 ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 583.
(d) Implied from Constitution.
(e) Constitution, statute, implied, case law, common law.
(f) Executive clemency.
(g) Only for EROs. When an ERO is submitted the legislature has 30
days to veto the ERO or it becomes law.
(h) To give immediate effect to state regulation in emergencies.
(i) To control administration of state contracts and procedures.
(j) To impound or freeze certain state matching funds.
(k)To reduce state expenditures in revenue shortfall.
(l) Inherent.
(m) To control procedures for dealing with public.
(n) Reorganization plans and agency creation.
(o) Executive reorganizations not effective if rejected by both houses
of legislature within 60 calendar days. Executive orders reducing
appropriations not effective unless approved by appropriations
committees of both houses of legislature.
(p)To assign duties to lieutenant governor, issue writ of special
election.
(q) Filing.
(r) Governor is exempt from the Administrative Procedures Act and
filing and administrative procedures Miss. Code Ann. § 25–43–102
(1972).
(s) Reorganization plans and agency creation and for meeting federal
program requirements. To administer and govern the armed forces of the
state.
(t) In addition to filing and publication procedures – Executive Orders
are countersigned by and filed with the Secretary of State and published.
(u) To administer and govern the armed forces of the state.
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(v) Must submit to the Secretary of State who must compile index and
publish Executive Orders. Copies must also be sent to President of the
Senate, Speaker of House and Principal Clerk of each chamber.
(w) To suspend certain officials and/or other civil actions.
(x) To designate game and wildlife areas or other public areas.
(y) Appointive powers.
(z) Executive authority implied by constitution except for emergencies
which are established by statute.
(aa) General power to issue executive orders to execute the authority
of the Governor as provided in the Constitution and state statute.
(bb) The governor has the authority, through state statute, to enact
executive orders that: create agencies, boards and commissions; and
reassigns agencies, boards and commissions to different cabinet
secretaries. However, in order for the continued operation of any agency
created by executive order the state legislature must approve legislation
that allows the agency to continue to operate, if not, the agency cannot
continue operation beyond sine die adjournment of the legislature for the
session.
(dd) For fire emergencies.
(ee) To transfer funds in an emergency.
(ff) Subject to legislative approval when inconsistent with statute.
(gg) Only if reorganization order filed with the legislature.
(hh) Some statutes set forward requirements for executive orders, but
few established procedures.
(ii) Expansion of governor’s existing state of emergency power to now
create a state of preparedness. The governor has the authority to issue an
executive order for a state of preparedness in advance of an anticipated
event affecting public safety (as of March 8, 2014).
During the first special session in 2016 the legislature gave the
governor the power, in the event a budget bill has not been enacted by June
30 of any year, to, by executive order, direct scheduled payments of
principal and interest due on bonds or notes of the state or its agencies,
boards, or commissions.
(jj) The governor has power to direct the Department of
Administration to conduct investigations of any executive or
administrative agency in order to determine feasibility of consolidating,
creating or rearranging agencies for the purpose of affecting the
elimination of unnecessary state functions, avoiding duplication, reducing
the cost of administration and increasing efficiency. Wis. Stat.
16.004(3)(a). The governor has power to coordinate services of personnel
across state agencies. Wis. Stat. 14.03.
(kk) No specific authorization granted, general authority only.
(ll) If executive order fits definition of rule.
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(mm) Can reorganize, but not create.
(nn) Executive Orders are filed in the Department of State.
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